'UNITED STA.TES fl. HUGHlTT.
47
UNITED Sl'ATES (District
HUGHIi'T.
C01.t:rl, N. D. New
February S.1891.)
BANxs-:M:AXmG FALSE REPORTS-INDIOTMENT,
An indictment under Rev.St. U. S. § 5209, which provides tbat every president of any association who .makes any false entries in any book, report" or statement oftha with iIitentto injure or defraud, shall be deemed guilty of a misthat defendant, as president of a certain hank, "did knowingly, wrongfully,' and unlawfully make, and cause to ,be made, false entries in B report or iltatement" of such bank,ibeing a report of its condition at'a designated time, "made to the comptroller of the currency, as required by lalY'to be Thereport wa,s set, out in full, and the particulars in which the entr\es were alleged to be false were 6tate,d tn, detail.E, that the indictment was, sum, 'llient,tbQughlt'did Dot tbB,t the re,port was made pursuant to a request of ,the ,CQmptrolIer, 0,l"al> ,0r ata time Pl'tlscribed by him under § 5211, pro-
:"" In 1887 the defendant >waS president of the First National Bank of 'Auburn, At the September termoC this court he was indicted 'for 'entries in. a report purporting to give:a stateIllent oPtlie condition of said bank, at the close of business on the 7th day of ber, 1887.' The indictineht is framed under seetion5209 of the Revised 'StatuteB;whichprovides that-', ' "Every'president ",,,,: ... , bhnyassociation wbo! false ,entry in' any book, report, or statement of the a:il/Joexation. Wltb, 'Intenl1, eitberca$6, to injure or,defraud the association or any other company. body , pQlitiQC)X.corporate,or individual or todecei ve. tbtl to examine the any such RMpej,,at'ioo; a'f)4 wiio wltb like intent aids or agent inaqy violation' of tbiS section, shall be dee,med' gUilty of a misde:meanor,'" etd. " i ' , · , -' ",
,.,* ··
or
, as president of said"bal\'lt7 '''Did ktl0W:inglv. wrongfulli'lI.Dd unlawfully make anll ,calise to faI,se entries in 'a re1-'0rt' or statement of the said First National Bank of Auburn, being a report of the condition of the First National Ba.bkof AUbuJ.;tliitthe close of business on the 7th day of December, 18t:l7, made- to the cOIIlptroller of the currency as required by law to be made to the comptroller of the currency." , ", The report is then set out in extenso, and the indictment:proceeds"---" 'K And whichsail:lreport or statement so made as aforesaid, then ana·thete purported to$how as required by law then and there, and did, in substance an!! f'fIect, purport to indicate and declare the true and wrrect cOndl,tiQnaR,4 standing of, tbesald the Fi!-'st at the, close of business on the.!lald seventh,day ofDecember, l;t.:, D,1887,N1Q. Which in which saId false entries were then and there made l1aaforeaaid,'wasa'cettai-n repoit or the said the First National Bank of' Auburn; in that behalf, 're{jUlred by law to be made to the comptroller of the currency, and whieh report or statement made asafol'esaid was .false 'and: untrue 'In the following respects and contained false entt'ies as follows, to-wit:" '" " , The, indicttnentthen'setacoutth,eitems ';;h1uec tlerba; ahd,states'itUle_ tail thepartiDulars,in whrohthey areeaid'tt> befw8'e"the coantlh-'qfies:
48
FEDERAL REPORTER,
vol. 45.
tion concluding with a full allegation of knowledge on the part of the defendant and of intent on his part to deceive. The indictment contains 18 counts. Those numbered 1st, 3d, 5th, etc., charge the defendant with making false entries in said report. Those num bered 2d, 4th, 6th, etc., charge him with aiding and abetting Oharles O'Brien, the cashier of the bank, in making false entries' in said report. The language quoted from the first count is repeated, in substance, in the other counts and in these respects all the counts are substantially similar. The reports which national banking associations are required by law to make are provided for by section 5211 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the act of February 26, 1881, as follows: "Every association sllall make to the comptroller of the currency not less than five reports during each year, according to the form prescribed by him, verified by the oath or affirmation of the president or cashier of such association, and attested with the signatures of at least three of the directors. Each such report shall exhibit in detail, and under appropfiate heads, the and liabilities of the association at the close of' business on any past day by bim specified; and shall be transmitted to the comptroller within five days after the receipt of a request or requisition therefor, from him, and in the same form in which it is made to the comptroller shall be published in a newspaper published in the place where such association is established," etc. , The indictment does not contain an allegation that the report in dispute waS made pursuant to a request of the comptroller or according to a form prescribed by him, or that the 7th of December, 1887, was specified by him as a daJ.in reference to which such report should exhibit the resources and liabilities of the bank. The demurrer is aimed at these omissions. It is argued that reports to the comptroller are pro-' vided for by section 5211 and nowhere else. Unless, therefore, a report is made pursuant to the requirements of that section it has no standing or vitality. As it is necessary to prove that the preliminary steps required by the statute have been taken, it is also necessary to allege that they have been taken, and the failure to do this is, it is insisted, fatal to the indictment. With the demurrer is united a motion to quash. John E. Smith, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the United State!:1. W. F. Cogswell, for the defendant. OOXE, J., (after 8tating the facts as above.) The indictment is framed under section 5209. The crime charged is a misdemeanor, expressly made so 1;>y statute. In such cases it is usually sufficient if the pleader states the offense in the language of the statute, provided the defendant is apprised with reasonable certainty of the charge made against him. In U. S. v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360, the court upheld an allegation that the defendant's still, boiler, etc., were used "for the purpose of distilling, within the intent andmeaning of the internal revenue laws of the United States." It was held that the language quoted sufficiently vised the defendant of the nature of the accusation made against The court said: "Where the offense is purely statutory, baving no relation to the common la\y,it. illl , a ge,Ileral rule, sufllcient in the indictment to charge the
UNITED STATES V. HUGHITT.
49
ant with acts coming fully within the statutory description, in the substantial words of the statnte, without any further expansion of the matter.' " In U. S. v. MilUl, 7 Pet. 138, the question certified to the supreme court was whether an indictment for advising a mail carrier to rob the mail ought to aver that the said carrier did in fact commit the offense of robbing the mail. The court said: "The answer to this, as an abstract proposition, must be in the affirmative. But if the question intended to be put is, whether there must be a distinct, substantive, and independent averment of that fact, we should say it is not necessary." In U. S. v. Bachelder, 2 Gall. 15, the indictment was framed under a statute making it an offense forcibly "to resist, prevent or impede, any offi,cers of the customs," etc., "in the execution of their duty." The indictmentcharged that the defendant"Impeded NeheQllah Jones in the execution of his office, as an officer of the customs for the port and district of Portsmouth, '" '!' '" to-wit, an inspector of the port and district of Portsmouth duly appointed and authorized to seize goods imported into said district." The indictment was upheld by Judge STORY. In State v. Temple, 12 Me. 214, where the indictment was for burning a meeting-house, under the provisions of a state statute, it was held to be unnecessary to allege the ownership or value of the house, or that it was at the time in: question used as a place for public worship. In Edge v. Com·· 7 Pa. St. 275, it was decided that an indictment against a public officer for misfeasance in office was sufficient if it alleged "that he was duly elected by the qualified voters of the township," etc. In U. S. v. Britton, 107 U. S. 655, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 512, the suprente court laid down the following as the necessary reqUisites for the proper averment of the crime of making false entries under section 5209: "(1) That the accused was the president or other officer of a national banking association, which was carrying on a banking business. (2) That being such president or other officer, he made In the book, report, or statement of the association, describing it, a false entry, describing it. (3) That such false entry was made with intent to injure or defraUd the association, or to deceive any agent. describing him. appointed to examine the affairs of the association. (4) Averments of time and place." It is true that in the Britton Que the false entries were alleged to be made in a book and not in a report of the bank, but the tenor of the decision is to the effect that the technical precision pointed out by this demurrer is not required in indictments under this section. The foregoing, and many other decisions that might be cited, establish the proposition that in misdemeanors created by statute it is, as a rule, sufficient to charge the offense in the language of the law; that the principal object of the indictment is to inform the accused of the precise nature of the charge brought against him, and, where this is done, the extremely technical rules of pleading applicable to common-law felonies maybe dispensed with. Applying these principles to the case in hand there can be little question that the indictment is sufficient. The defendant can have no doul:!t v.45F.no.1-4
FEDERAL REPORTER, vol. 45.
·ccin;rplied:witb, and, therefore; tbat, 18 unneces!iil1Y .them. The \ .of ,e' any flllEle many, report or stateUl:ent oft,?e..assocJ.atlOn." Th El :, statute. inakesno .pr\>Yision"fcii tqe of statements eo And yet It was clearly the wtentl,oJi or the law-makers to punish theniaking offalseePtriea,notOJ:?\'yin .but in statements of the condition of tb,e bank, if such entries were- made an,nutilly, with intent to <)eceivtl.. Section 52tJprovideli for five. · but if the association sees fit to volunteer other reports containing false 'entries made with the express purpose of deceiving the officers of the law can it be doubted that such reports ·as to the' true condition of the would be within the provisions of section 5209? A constructhm that 'they would not be defeats the obvious intent and purpose of the Iaw. By llendingafa]serepottto the'comptroller or an examiner, at a critical period,suilpieion might be allayed and an unfounded confidence created', under cov:el' -of which :' the; ballkcould be plundered and the grossest ·frauds perpetrated with impunity. It cannot be, dOUbted that a report, .whether called for by thecornptrollet or not, ,which is a report,in the "usual form, Mthe condition 'of tlieassociation, made by its president in his official capacity andtrarismitted to the comptroller. Js'within the section in question provided it contil.hisfalseentl'iesmade with intent to ·deceive.; A bank officer who bits made such ishmentby showing that the fraud was voluntadly conimitted, and at a. time when· under no obligationfo furnish any report or statement whatever; The statute dtiesnotconfinethe crinreof:making false
:aa tci'the ,natttre of the charge agaipsfhirh: The report which is said to contain the false entries is set out in full. The date when the report 'was made and the date as ,to which the condition of the bank is given, are both stated with perfect accuracy. The defendant is informed not 'omyi thatthe report was in fact made to the'comptroUerof the currency, but that it a report which the law the association to make to t.Qecomptfoller. .:Efis'attention is ,thus called directly to section 5211. . IIow can any mistake or misapprehensiOli as to the offense charged? It is iricrediblethat the defendant can be misled. Some things ma,y be even ,Whereareport is t?ought the requIrements ?f anothe1"'secbon of the law conchtlOns as to the time of' making' and send}ng as to 'fAe :qontents of the report need. not be sPecifically pleaded. "Their will be pre." If another ofthe.act prescribed the'Il,gm.ber and names of the to keEiP:, their,contents and the manner of keeping them, itQ.!Lll hanny be dow:>t!?d an indictment charging the makipg pf ",,false en;try .the ·tion. ·...' JUhe form, f,llildthlllXllpt ade,fen,se,.itwouJi:l. 'pe'fiif the,defep.'dant tpsh0W" ;It·.·. it, 'is that, pa . t:l!;!. P,'. nn. ... a'l'y:t.o ,. pwv.eth.at.. e rag Bt.r?n re .. . t..,?e.. . ./. sect;on 5211, J1..t . . out by the deJUurrer, have been
tR..
ROYER!!'. StJ:ULTZ BELTL"iG 00.
51
entries to CIa report made to the comptroller under tbe provisions off;ection 5211 and pursuant tobis requestj" it Qovers "any report or statement." The construction contended for by the defendant is too narrowj it does not fairly the legislative intent. The demurrer is overruled.
RoYER .tI. SHULTZ BEL'rINGCo.
(Circuit OO'lJlrt,E. D; Mf8801111"1, E. D. . January 27, 1891.) L PA'l'BN'1'8 WOK. IKVBNTIONS-AOTION,AT
t.
In an action at law for infringement, actual .damages only are recoverable; and althoqgh evidence ie receivable in euch action of profits realized by the infringer, yet the amount of such profits cannot be taken as the measure of damage, unless other evidence is offered from which it may fairly be inferred that, but fO,r the infringement., the patentee would have realized the profits shown to have been,realized by 'the infringer. ' "
Sn!B:';"'INPEBItNCES-EvIDBNCB-NOJlINAL DAMAGES.
a.
the evidence showed that the article made by the defendant by the aid of deVice was different from that made by, the,patentee, and was produced bya different process; and was also of a Buperior quality and finish,. held, that the CQ1i1J't would not Jufer ,that the patentee had lost as much as the hifringer had gaineq, by the use of the iDvention; and heW, further, that, in the absence of any reliable evidence showing what portion of ,the profits made bytbe infringer ,would have been realized,by the patentee but for the infringement, the damages of t,be latter must be a88essed at a nominal sum.
SAMf!-lIARKBT VALUE' OF USE-ROYALTIBS-LICBNSB FEES.
Tbe market :value of theuBe of an invention can only be tllken as the measure 01 damage in those cases wb,ere the patentee has established Buch market value b, use invention to the publio for prescribed royalties or Hcens'
At Law. M.. A.Wheaton, Wm. M. Ecdes, and James O. Broadhead, for plilintiff. O. H.Krnm, for defendant. THAYER, J. This is an action at law for infringement of letters patent No.'fl,920,.issued to Herman and Louis Royer on May 12, 1868. It .was tried before Judge 'hEAT in October, and at sion of the plaintiff's testimony the court directed the jury to find in !avarof the defendant. Vide 28 Fed. Rep. 850, and 29 Fed. Rep. 281. A.writ of error . baving been prosecuted to the supreme court, anew trial was awarded, for reasons stated in the opinion of the supreme court. 135 U.S. 319, 10 Sup. Ct. The opinion &1$0 contains a full description of the character of the invention. By consent ofparties, the laSt trial of was before the cpurt without the, intervention of a juty; and the .defenl'les relied upon were as follows: ,PirBt, tpat the patentees, Hermauland LQuis Royer, were not joint inv:entorSj8econ.d, the letters patent are void for: want of novelty; patent is void for want o.f utilityiJoi.lrth, thaHhe cla.imed .patentees were: inpubUe use for 1ll00,e than· two years apatentwll,lil ". .applied,,fof; ·Imd, flftl;., .that,thedefepdantspaye, DPt Jnfring!'ld.
52
In view of the presumptions raised by the patent, the burden is on the defendant to establish the first four defenses, and I am of the opinion that it has failed to establish either of them by such satisfactory evidence as would warrant me in declaring the patent invalid. While the device covered by the first claim is simple, yet the evidence satisfies me that it is of great utility in the manufacture of certain kinds of leather, and for that reason, among others, patentable novelty must be conceded to it. The simplicity of a device from a mechanical stand-point, taken in connection with great utility, in some instances is the best evidence of its patentability. I am also of the opinion that the testimony shows an infringement of the first claim of the Royer patent. The question of damages thus becomes an important matter for consideration, and to that I address myself. The action being at law, it must be borne in mind that the measure ofrecovery is not the same as in equity. In the latter forum, by the express provisions of the statute, (section 4921,) profits made by an infringer by the use of an invention may be recovered, and, in addition thereto, compensation may be obtained for any direct injury done tothe patentee that is not fully recompensed bythe recovery of the profits realized by the infringer. But at law the measure of recovery is the actual loss or damage that the plaintiff has sustained as the proximate result of the infringement. In an action at law the question ianot what the patentee may have speculatively lost, but what he actually did lose as shown by the evidence. Seymour v. McCormick, 16 How. 480; Philp v. Nock, 17 Wall. 460; Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U. S. 64; Cowin v. Rumsey, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 275; Rob. Pat. § 1053. In this respect no change was made by the act of July 8, 1870. It is still true that only actual damages are recoverable in a suit at law, (BirdsaU v. Coolidge, supra;) and whether the suit be at law or in equity, the burden is on the plaintiff to show the damages actually sustained. The proof in that respect, as has been said, "must be clear and definite;" It must present sufficient data to enable a court or jury to estimate with certainty what the plaintiff has lost by the infringement, and what cOmpensation he is entitled to. New York v. Ransom, 23 How. 487; Philp v. Nock, supra; Rude v. Westcott, 130 U. S. 152, 9 Sup. Ot. Rep. 463; Rob. Pat. § 1053, and citations. In an action at law for infringement, it is true that evidence may be given of profits made by the defendant by the use of the patented device, (Philp v. Nock, supra;) but such proof is merely a means to an end. Profits eo nomine are not recoverable in such action, and such proof is of no avail in estimating the damages, unless further evidence is produced from which the court or jury can legitimately infer, that but for the infringement, the profits realized by the infringer, or some definite portion thereof, would have been realized by the patentee. In some'instal1ces the inference is 'readily drawn, especially in those cases where both par'ties 'are shown to have had equal facilities for manufacture, and the patented device is in itself a complete machine or compound, in all respects new, and ,the inventor has elected to rea:lize onhis invention· by manu..
ROYER 11. SHULTZ BELTING CO.
53
facturing and selling the patented machine or article; but in most other cases proof that a defendant has made large profits furnishes in itself no basis for a correct estimate of the injury sustained by the patentee. It does not follow that what the infringer has made, the patentee,as a proxi. mate result of the infringement, has lost; and there is no presumption, either of law or fact, that the actual damage done to the patentee is com· mensurate with the gains of the infringer. Seymour v. McCormick,swpra; Dobson v. Caryet Co., 114 U. S. 439, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 945; Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U. S. 10, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 946; Buerk v. Imhaeuser, 2 Ban. & A. 452; BeU v. Stamping Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 549; Roemer v. Siman, 31 Fed. Rep. 41; Rob. Pat. § 1062.. In the light of these principles, the evidence in the case at bar must be considered. The plaintiff's patent covers "an improved machine for converting raw hides into leather," as he describes it in his specification. There is no evidence that he granted to anyone a license to use the chine during the life of the patent, or that he ever manUfactured, or attempted to manufacture, the machine for sale. He appears to .have made use of the invention only in his own establishment in San Francisco, to manufacture lace leather, and an article called "Fulled Rawhide Belting," which seems to have been his chief product; hence it must be assumed that he elected to profit by his monopoly by that mode of use,' and not otherwise. There is no evidence in the case tending to show that plaintiff ever attempted to manufacture by means of his machine any other article than fulled rawhide belting and lace leather.' By the process which he employed for that purpose, the hides used were unhaired by sweating, and, without being subjected to any tanning process, were converted into fulled rawhide or lace leather, as was desired, by the mechanical operation of the .patented machine, and by working ina 'stuffing mixture as the operation progressed. What the stuffing mixture was is not definitely shown, further than that one in· gredient was tallow; but it does appear that the hides used were not limed or tanned to any extent, and that one of the chief objects the plaintiff hoped to accomplish by the use of his invention was to produce an article out ofrawhide fit for belting and lace leather without liming or tanning. The evidence shows, on the other hand, that the belting and lace leather manufactured by the defendant by. the use of the infringing device differs from the plaintiff's product in a material respect, and is produced by an essentially different process, devised by the defendant's president. The hides are first unhaired by liming, and, after being bated, are subjected to a distinct tanning process of some days' duration, which gives to the finished product unmistakable tanned or leather surfaces, although there is an interior stratum of fulled rawhi::le. Judging both from the samples of the two products produced ·during the trial, .and from other testimony as well, the court finds, asa matter of fact, that defendant's belting and lace leather is of a s,uperior quality. Another fact found by the court should also be mentioned in this connection. ·Whjlethe machines used by the defendant during the period .of infringement to manufacture belting"and lace lea:ther embodied th&
54
1I'EDERALREPORTEB,
voL 45.
by the first claim of plaintiff's patent, and possibly by his second claim, yet defendant made improvements on plaintiff's machine of a character as rendered the machines used by defendant more convenient, and less expensive to handle, and thereby reduced to some the cost of production. The only other evidence in the case that has any bearing on thequesof damages First, testimony tending to show, and from which the court might approximately find, the number of hiqes treated by the defendant with the infringing device during the period of the infringement; and"secondly, testimony of the plaintiff that in his opinion theadvan-. tage realized by the use of the device amonnted to as much as four, and certainly to as much .as two, dollars per hide on each hide treated by the defendant. This estimate of the plaintiff appears to be based on the saving bfexpensefor labor incident to the use of the invention. On this testimony the court is asked to allow two dollars per hide for each hide treated and 'sold by the defendant, and to .Bssess plaintiff's damages at the sum of $297,760. This the court must decline to do. The saving in the cost of labor of from two to four dollars per hide, testified to by the plaintiff, (asSuming his estimate to becorrect,}is precisely the advantage or profit dtie·,tothe operatiop of the patented device that the plaintiff migbtclaim if the. suit was inequity. But it does not follow., nor is it a reasonable infetence·under tbe evidence in this case, that plaintiff was damaged to the extent of two dollars per hide on each hide treated by the defendant; and W is .only actual, as distinguished from speculative, damages, that are recoverable in this action. Such an inference be justified if it appeared that during the period of infringement plaintiff possessed adequate means and facilities for supplying all the demands of his own and the defendant's customers, and if it appeared that the belting and lace leather manufactured by both parties was produced by substantially the same process,and was oJ substantially the same quality, and if it had been shown by the testimony of any considerable number of defendant's customers that but for the presence in the market of defendant's product they would have bought from the plaintiff. But there is no testimony of this character in the case. On the contrary, and as before stated, defendant, by a process of its own, manufactured partially tanned lace and belting leather ofsuperior quality and finish, which no doubt bad great advantages in the market over merely fulled rawhide, such as the plaintiff' at all times produced. I am satisfied that by reason of its superior quality and finish. there was a greater demand for defendant's product than plaintiff would have succeeded in ,establishing for fulled rawhide had he met with nocompetitionj and I have no doubt that defendant made sales to a large amount that would not have been made by plaintiff under any circull1stances,and that it had numerous customers who would not have become plaintiff's customers in any event·. In view of these facts, the-inference thatplaintitl's actual loss by reason of the infringement is commensurate with defendant's gains is entirelyinadmissible. There is no legalpresulilption to .that effect, and theevi. dence negatives .such an inference.
EDISON ELECTRIC
LIGHTING CO.
Nor is there any evidence thnt'would i warrant me in finding approximately what part, if any, of defendant's 'giUns, due to the use of the in": fringing device,would have been realized by the plaintiff but for the fringement. Any effort in that direction would necessarily fail for want of sufficient data to base a finding on which I could rest with, any contiqence its accuracy. It, was suggested during the trial that pllJ,intiff was entitled to rec<;Jver the ,market value of the use of the invention, and that the advantage that defendant was shown to have realized might be taken as establishing ,the market value of such use. With reference to thissuggesHon, it is sufficient to say that I know of no instance in which, in 11 suit ,ll-t law, a patentee may recpver as damages of the nse of ' his invention, except in those cases where, by the mode of enjdyment of the m(imopoly, the patentee himself established value, by granting the use of the invention to the,,public fo1;' prescribeg royalties orlicense fees; Rude v. Westcott, Btlpra.Thisjsnot such a case, and besides '1 should not leel disposed, in a ease' onhis character, to determine the general market value of theuse of 8,n'invention'sol-elyupon an opinion expressed by ,patentef( 8S to the effected by the use of the same. , ",:" ;" ,',;";'<,'; As ,'the ease. sU,mds, ,th,erefore" the, pJaintiff" ,apparently bY,his',I\egleet, has allowed the time to expire 'within ",hieli ne' 'could! have'thaintained SU!t in equity,an4hadan, ,1>Y the appears toha"e been flllly aware of ment for the, suit w8sfil¢d,'and 'in the pis patent expired, which necessitated s' sui(atJltw., In that fl;lfUtn the rule 'is to award compensation for actual10sBes, a.nd the actual'loss is not A judgment must accordingly be entered (or nominal damages',which the court assesses in the sum of six centRo . " ..
, EDISON ELE<!1'RIC LIGHT Co. t1. UNITED STA'rES. ELECTRIC LIGRTINGCo.
(OiraUA.t
coUrt, S.D. New
5,18?L.> COMMUNIQATlbN8, .
1. ,
PAT)!:NTS l"Oll
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8.
9. SAME..-l'RODl1QTIQN Oll'P,APJliB/l-SU!'pqlNA TEcuM. ' .' '. ' Defendant, in ap. intnrigement of a,patent, claimed that compiainant, in a divisional aPll1ication 'uponwhtch letters pQtent were bevel' issued,made admission s which greatly restrict tbe claim of the ratent in suit, and, a foundation . . .. for I;lecondary evidence being laid, sougbt to compe oompl.alnanttobringinto Court a coPy tbereof, wliicl:dvas ia its posse&llion. , that; a 8ubp(l'lna d.uces' tecum W6s'\.he,proper methQd wbel) the paperwaddentified QY allP·ecifio dEl!lCriptioll. '
Rev.St. U. all,applicatiohs.fbrpatents to be filed intbe patent-ofliQe declares that "all applicatIons' interfermgwith OOiVeat8" shall bedeposited in tbe confidential arcbives, and ,lllakes them: privileged, and amounts to,a;n implted.declaration j;bat all otbllr appllcations.sball not be privileged.
.'
catiitg'oh'anges tor,subsequent amendments, whichw8re tbe 'results of colnmun1eatiOD. between counsel and client, did not render the paper privilllged
flWli tpat tpo copy 'hail UPOJ1 it vafious memoranda notIn the origi'tlal; Iudi-
l'AEBa---PmvIJ,ojlGED 'Cor.niaNI(:ATIONS·. ·
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