901 ., .',
RICHMOND "-' .;,r.:;,:':'1 ,I'
& ' . ".. ;, ,.i,
:". . .::
at. JrIa.12O, 18t9.)
.. '.
i'!
1.
trial judge 10r,iguatuN 811ft limed
... '.DB:iU.L CQuBT-si;,l.TB PB;,l.OTICB-RBVpr" BY CIRCUIT. CoURT 01' ,.\PPII.U& . The practice alid rules of the state courts do not apply te proceedings taken ill '" libe.olrcuit 'couN of th8 Unl1led States,for \he purpose of revie;w in the circuit. ooun
counsel, buta paper was tiled entitled a" Bill of Exceptlons..", Held. that a certiJicaw olt11e trial a1.tbe exception.!!et out in the of errora, ceJ.led tbe 'Bill-of ExceptioIls,' "were dUll. taken at tbe trial-and note4 by bim Oil the minutes;· and reduced to :writing .. tti8&8signment of errara,and allowed b7 .'" h,tmi . ,
ot afPeala..
"
'lnl1:n-or to the of the. United States for the District of .., . .',; . . ',., '. \ \ by J. L. McG!36,,,nd W. R. Dillingham the Richmond Dan'ille to recover for the Joss of live stock through defendant's .....L8J common carrier. Judgment for plaintifi'8. brings ·.·..I\.ffir.med. . , for plaintiff in en-or· . in . Befqre'/Ftl'LLP:R, Circuit and B9ND and GOFF, Circuit Judges. :.
Circuit Justige. This case was tried to a jury at the August of. the circujt court of the.United States. for the district of Sou*h Carolina,at Greemriile, and a verdict returned -in favor of plaintiffs bEllow, defendants iJl4'lrror August 7, August 8th a motion for new trial was¥lllde,whiCh. ,was 15th, and on notice ,of ",n:!Joppeal an appeal allowed, and the amounto( BUpe'I'Bedea8 bOQ<l was fixed.,iQe bond was. approved September ·Septer,nb,ljlr: 17 , 1891, jUdgment and execution were filed. The qeing .at law, am!,not open to a writ of error was taken 1891, andQn the day there was filed a . '1 Bil-to! ,Excl1ptions," signed by counsel for defendant below. The certificate of the clerk to the transcript is to the effect that "the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the records, proceedings, and of the verdict in the case of McGee « Dillingham, Plaintiffs, against the Richmond« Danville Railroad Company, Defendant, rendered as aforesaid, together with all the proceedings had in the cause relating to the same." No bill of exceptions, signed by the trial judge, appears in the record. The August term expired during that month, and no order was entered extending the time within which such bill might be prepared and filed, nor was there any consent of counsel giving further time for that purpose. When the case came on for argument in this court, February 3, 1892, the attention of counsel was called to the fact that there was no bill of exceptions. and argument was sus
RICHMOND & 1>. R. CO. v..M?GEE.
907
pended and the case passed. A certificate of the trial judge, dated February 20th, has now beeh produced, stating that"All of the exceptions set out in the assignment of errors, called the I Bill of Exceptions' in the abO\'e-entitled cause. and part of the record. were duly takpn on the trial. and were noted by me in the progreils of the case, and signed on my minutes. 'After the trial these exceptions were' duly reduced in form to writing. as the aSSignment of errors, and submitted to me. I allowed the same, but did not sign them, because they were really the assignml'nt of errors. They correspond, however, with the exceptions. taken and noted at the trial." Some correspondence has also been laid before us, which, if treated
as properly examinable, does not change the facts. From the foregoing statement it will be seen that no bill of exceptions was presented to the trial judge for signature, and signed by him during the term at which the trial was had and judgment rendered, nor within any extension of time for that purpose granted by him and entered of record, or consented to by counsel. This being so, the certificate of February 20th is entirely unavailing, even if in itself sufficient if executed in due time. rhe case comes cle.arly within Muller v. Ehlers, 91 U. S. 249. See, also, Jones v. Grover & B,tker S. M. 0>., 131 U. S. AppendiX, cl.; U. S. v. Carey, 110 U. S. 51, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 424; Expre88 Co. v. Mi(lin, 132 U. S. 531, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166; Gla8peU v. Railroad 0>., 144 U. ;:;. 211, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593. In Daria v. Patrick, 122 U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1102, the delay was attributable to the judge after the party excepting had done all that he could to procure the settlement of and signature to the bill, while here nobill of exceptions was ever presented, nor was the paper relied on as such tendered to the judge until after the time within which he could aut had expired. We may observe, further, that the practice and rules of state courts do not apply to proceedings taken. in the circuit courts of the United States for the purpose of reviewing in this court the judgments of such circuit courts. Clwteaugny Ore & Iron Co., Petitioner, 128 U. S. 544, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150. 'l'lJe true rule upon this subject is laid down in Mtdler v. Ehler8, and is expressed, in suLstance, in rule 36 of the rules of United States circuit court for the district of South Carolina, which provides for the taking of exceptions on the trjul, though the bill of exceptions may be drawn up and settled afterwards; but only "within such times and under such rulel:! as the court, in its discretion, may prescribe at the time." As the errors. relied on are only such as could arise on a bill of exceptioll8. the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed; Bud it is 80 ordered.
00,8
I
vol. 50.
Appeal of FIELD et al. (etrcwlt Court, N. D. lll(nois. June 8, 1899.) CusTOMS DUTIl!IS...,PROPERTY SUBJECT TO DUTy....,SILK VEILS.
Silk goods, which,although m.ade in the manner of laces, and having the substantial characteristics of laces, are not commerciallv known as "laces," but as "silil; nets,'" "veilings," and "drapery nets, "are dutiable under Schedule L, par. 414; 01 the customs act of 1890, as a manufacture of silk not otherwise provided for, and not as silk laces.
N. W.Bliss, for appellants. E.Milchrist, I:. '"
LiL! 11
u. S. Dist.
Atty., for the collector.
'BL'ofJG:M-r',' District Judge. This is an appeal from the board of gen'llppi1Hsersundersectionl5. of the 'customs administrative act of June.11Q,i'1890.The appellants hnported to the port of Chicago silk collector classed as silk "laces," and assessed the duty at'the rate 0£60 per cent. ad valorem. Appellants. gave the collect6t ri6tice of their dissatisfaction' with his decision in classi fying and 'I ' , .' , , assesllTIlg' the ,duty on ,said goods, and thereupon the collector transmitted exhibits conneoted with the entry 'of such duty to the board of general appraisers at New York city. The i]'C)ltt'd. 'df general appraisers, after an examination and hearing, rendered a deciSi6hilffirming theltction of the collector; and the appellants, being With such decision, applied to this court for a review of the law and fact inv()lved in the decision. The record of the the board of general appraisers, together with the eVi'dence' and exhibits before them, has been duly returned to this court, of the appellants further proof has been taken in tHe' m'annerrequired by the statute, and the case brought to hearing upon the return of the hoard of general appraisers, and proofs taken. The contention of the importer is that the goodgiiti'question are' not known as "silk laces," but are commercially kilown 'by the trade asl'silk nets," "veilings," and "drapery nets," and are dtitWble asa manufacture of silk not otherwise provided for, at 50 per cetit;iad valorem, under Schedule L,par. 414,of the customs act of 06tober'l,'!1890. The board of general appraisers, in its opinion in the case; 'htls:goDEl' very fully into the art ofl'lace making, and the difference lkt#e'ehithi'lfa'brics knowrias "laces" arid' "woven fabrics, "and their conclusions in the matter are quite clearly expressed in the 2d, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th findings of fact, which form part of their opinion, which I quote as follows: "(2) The merchandise in question consists of plain and a variety of figured silk iace nets and veilinga and silk lacll drapery nets made on the lace machine, and distinguished by the hexagonal mesh." "(6) The hexagonal mesh is the essential feature, as it is the distinguishing characteristic of lace, the process of its formation being akin to knitting as it is the antithesis of weaving.