61 F. 3d 916 - Stanton v. Gilbert Western Corporation

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff Gary K. Stanton appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Gilbert Western Corporation and the denial of his motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment in this suit arising out of plaintiff's involuntary termination from employment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291,2 and affirm.

Plaintiff asserted state-law claims for breach of an implied employment contract and promissory estoppel. Although plaintiff conceded that nobody promised him that he could be terminated only for just cause and with notice, see Appellant's App. at 157-58, and that some of defendant's employee handbooks and policy manuals contain disclaimers that employment is at-will, see id. at 158, he argues that various statements in defendant's handbooks and manuals nevertheless amount to an implied contract that employees would be terminated only for just cause and with notice.

Because we are sitting in diversity, we apply Utah law to the substantive legal questions in this case. Perlmutter v. United States Gypsum Co., 54 F.3d 659, 662 (10th Cir.1995). We review the grant of summary judgment using federal standards, however. Id. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard as that applied by the district court. Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co., 38 F.3d 510, 512 (10th Cir.1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" to be tried. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a "genuine" issue exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Under Utah law, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, employment is presumed to be at-will. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989). Plaintiff's claims depend on evidence of an implied contract or promise that defendant would not terminate plaintiff except for just cause and with notice. See Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 967 (Utah 1992)(plaintiff must prove implied contract created by mutual assent); Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 768-69 (Utah 1991)(estoppel requires proof of defendant's promise). Although whether there is an implied contract is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, "if the evidence presented is such that no reasonable jury could conclude that the parties agreed to limit the employer's right to terminate the employee, it is appropriate for a court to decide the issue as a matter of law." Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991).

The district court thoroughly reviewed plaintiff's allegations of fact in light of the governing law. We have also carefully reviewed the parties' briefs and the record on appeal. We hold that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence that his employment was other than at-will to create a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide. We therefore affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant. For the same reason, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion.

Plaintiff's request for oral argument is DENIED. The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is AFFIRMED.